Bob Strassler, editor of the Landmark Thucydides, held a wonderful Q&A session tonight, Monday, June 15 at 8pm eastern with the Thucydides reading group.
And in the comments below you can see some of the questions that readers asked.
Bob Strassler, editor of the Landmark Thucydides, held a wonderful Q&A session tonight, Monday, June 15 at 8pm eastern with the Thucydides reading group.
And in the comments below you can see some of the questions that readers asked.
June 15, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (6)
The standard current view is that Thucydides did what he says he did - started writing up, not just taking notes, from the late 430s on, i.e. probably before war actually broke out in spring 431. But it was only after his exile in 424 that he could (i) see things more from the Spartan side than he'd been able to up to that point and so (ii) reconsider what he'd written so far, which might also have encouraged some rewriting, esp. of a set piece like the Mytilene Debate in Book 3.
However: a famous passage in Book 2 - the obituary notice of Pericles in ch. 65 - must have been at least reworked in or after 404, in the light of Athens's eventual defeat, since it not only refers to the final defeat but actually explains the defeat in part in light of the death of Pericles (as long ago as 429!) and Athens' failure to find a worthy successor to him as Leader.
However that is not the only passage that either was reworked or was written up substantially for the first time in or after 404, in the wake of or in the light of Athens's defeat. The best scholarly discussion of all such passages, and of the 'composition problem' in general, is to be found in an Appendix by Andrewes at the end of the 5th volume of the Commentary by A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. Dover (Oxford 1981). This has not been superseded, I think, though there is a new Commentary, by S. Hornblower, in 3 vols (1991-2008). The older 'analyst' position, which tried to identify 'layers' of composition, has now been abandoned, but it remains a question when precisely any particular passage was written or written up, as opposed to when it was 'thought'.
At any rate, when he died, he was only in the middle of the summer of 411, though we know he lived at least 7 years after that, and Book 8 has several marks of incompleteness, which suggests that as the war went on, so Thucydides fell more and more behind the actual events in his writing of them up.
Paul
May 27, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (2)
We didn't get to one of Dan Gabree's questions on the last call. I wouldn't mind addressing it on our next call next month. Here is the essence of Dan's inquiry:
But the one other thing that came up for me was a question of when T wrote this history. Throughout it has appeared (at least to me) as if he were perhaps recording the many years of war as a news reporter might today... live, as it happens. But seeing the outcome in Sicily and thinking back to his idea that this was to be the war of wars that future generations would learn from, I wonder when he actually realized that it was indeed such a war and that the history of it were worth writing down for posterity.
And if there is a chance that he did decide at the end to write this record, how old was the information for the early years some decades before?
Truly a remarkable story. His vantage point must have been incredible. Or did he interview soldiers (both sides?) like a reporter after the fact? As was pointed out earlier, how did he know what Nicias' letter said?
May 19, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
Here's the audio recording for the Book 7 call. Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
May 05, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
These ARE indeed a fantastic way to prepare for tonights discussion. I, too, side with Paul's observations of Nicias, although this chapter was written in such a way as to make it impossible not to feel the pain that the Athenians were going through, and not merely physical pain. Let the empathy roll! They left Athens as Rulers of the World and now found themselves on the brink of defeat, and death.The actions of the generals and the soldiers were all incredible to read and imagine. What went through their minds during the long silent march, after leaving friends behind?
But the one other thing that came up for me was a question of when T wrote this history. Throughout it has appeared (at least to me) as if he were perhaps recording the many years of war as a news reporter might today... live, as it happens. But seeing the outcome in Sicily and thinking back to his idea that this was to be the war of wars that future generations would learn from, I wonder when he actually realized that it was indeed such a war and that the history of it were worth writing down for posterity.And if there is a chance that he did decide at the end to write this record, how old was the information for the early years some decades before?Truly a remarkable story. His vantage point must have been incredible. Or did he interview soldiers (both sides?) like a reporter after the fact? As was pointed out earleir, how did he know what Nicias' letter said?I can't wait to hear your ideas this evening.
Dan G.
On Mon, May 4, 2009 at 5:02 PM, Janicki, Jim <Jim.Janicki@invitrogen.com> wrote:
What a warm-up for tonight calls, which I think is going to be exciting.I saw things more similar to Paul's comments and it takes a lot of effort for me to immerse myself in Nicias's context, which is what I think Paul is doing well for us below. The one thing I kept coming back to is what "virtues" was T really referring to? I suppose the obvious is that Nicias tried to keep Athens from over stretching its reach and when he didn't succeed he still laid down his life for his men and his country. He also stuck it out even when he was injured enough that he thought he should be removed from the battle and Athens refused. Alcibiades gave Nicias something to really think about. Look what happened to him? Also, remember that the Spartans were the ones seen observing the old traditions in strict form even though it hurt their war strategies. Remember that it's why the "300" were left out there on their own by Sparta. And Sparta was seen as holding a higher ideal because of things like this. So, it would have been seen as virtuous to wait after the eclipse. But, which "virtues" is T really referring to? Is it all of them or are some more important than others? Or, does T know of other things Nicias did and wants to represent him in a good light for some other reason?
Jim J.
While it may appear to us that Nicias was more interested in his reputation, I tend to think he is more concerned about public opinion. Knowing what we know about Athenian Democracy, specifically that poor public opinion can result in exile, and that (much like today) the Athenians were very interested laying blame for unfortunate circumstances, he was, in actuality, concerned about his very life.
3. A cursory glance shows instances where it is clear (to me) "his life was regulated with strict attention to virtue." (At least the virtue of the time), he surrenders himself in exchange for the life of his soldiers
4. Since when is the virtue of a man based on whether or not his one or more of his efforts were a success rather than the motivation and intention with which he acted? (his failure to motivate the troops, troops who were so stunned they walked away from their dead – something that happened at no other time so far in the history)
I just kept tossing and turning thinking, "What a predicament he was in. There was no way he could win, no matter what, but he had to keep the troops moving. In truth, it would be far better for him to die in a vain battle than return in defeat. After seeing how previous battles had ended, he was probably fairly certain he would be killed, not ransomed, if handed over to enemies." So my perception was that he was an honorable man, who at the very least, made very valiant efforts to minimize the loss of life among his troops, knowing full well that if he ever returned home, it would be to dishonor and possible exile from the very country he served so well.
Paul G.
Hi Gang,
1. Book 7 is among the most "dramatic" we've read.
The most "dramatic" example is the final retreat and slaughter of the Athenians in the river Assinarus near the quarries. This was heartbreaking for me to read. The Athenians have lost their naval fleet (and superiority), burned their own ships, left their fallen dead behind, and are retreating desperately. As they reach the river, they are reduced to drinking the foul and bloody water as the Syracusans "butchered them" (7.84.5). This phrase struck me so much that I looked up the Greek. Thucydides writes "malista esphagon" which, more literally, means that they violently cut their throats like sacrificial animals; the same verb is used in sacrifice and the noun form of esphagon is the bowl used to catch the blood of sacrifice. It's pretty chilling in the Greek. There are other examples, but the language suggests the complete breakdown of Athenian moral and human standing. The great Athenians are reduced to animals driven off cliffs and impaled on their own spears.
2. I see T. using parallelisms to his reports of Corcyra and Pylos.
In a way, Thucydides seems to outline why Athens lost instead of why Syracuse won the Sicilian front. In my thinking, there are echoes of the Athenian's past actions at Corcyra and Pylos. Some thoughts:
3. Thucydides' comment that Nicias "least deserved his fate" (7.86.5) doesn't seem to match his own narrative of Nicias's actions. I have to wonder if the overall story of Nicias serves Thucydides as a canvas for commenting on the Athens from which he was an exile. Nicias always seems to be worried more about his reputation (cf., 5.16.1) and the letter (7.8.2 - 3; how did T. learn the contents?) he writes seems to prove this (to me).
I'll talk more about Alcibiades during our call. I sense that T. is also using his story to some "interpretive" means. There's lots more, but this was all I could get down in email. See you all tonight.
Tim A.
May 04, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
Here's the audio recording for the Thucydides Book 4 call. Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
May 03, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
Here is the recording for the Thucydides Books 5 & 6 call. Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
May 03, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
1. As you read Book 7, it becomes clearer and clearer that the Athenian expedition is turning into tragedy. What was your experience of reading this book? It does contain some of Thucydides' best writing - and I hope you enjoyed his majestic command of the narrative. Even as you enjoyed the pace and command of the story did you also find it simply hard to read as the tragedy unfolded?
2. Let's review some of the important details of the book:
2.a In the first three chapters of Book 7, what are the main
differences:
in leadership of the Athenian and Syracusan force?
How are the actions of Gylippus and Nicias contrasted?
How does this foreshadow the turning point of the war?
2.b What role does "time" play? Was "time" strategically against the Athenians? Why?
2.c Focus on chapters 11-15, Nicias' speech - what does the tone say of the mood of the army?
2.d The incident at Mycalessus is terrible and tragic. How does it relate to the telling of the Sicilian campaign?
2.e The arrival of Demosthenes from Athens complicates the Athenian command structure. How does the shared leadership between Nicias and Demosthenes fail? How could it have worked better?
2.f How did the Athenians' failed assault on the Syracusan wall (chs. 43-44) seem to hurt the Athenians and help the Syracusans?
2.g Why was the first major naval defeat so devastating to the Athenians? How could the Syracusans take advantage of it?
2.h In chs. 63-68, how do Nicias' words fail in his attempt to rally the Athenians? How is his own physical condition symbolic of the Athenian situation as a whole? Why, in chs. 66-68, are Gylippus' words more effective? What does his speech have that Nicias' doesn't?
2.i How does Thucydides describe defeat in ch. 71 in this crucial sea & land battle? How does it evoke the pathos of other great historical turning points that you can think of? (I personally liken this to Stalingrad, the Tet Offensive, and even Hemingway's description of the retreat from Caporetto in A Farewell to Arms always comes to mind.) How does Thucydides evoke pity for the Athenians out of their former pride in the final surrender?
3. How are Nicias' last encouragements to his troops, an appeal to mercy from the gods, ironically related to the Athenian demands at Melos three years earlier in the war? Is this Thucydides' way of implying that Athens got what it deserved?
May 03, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
Hello there, reading friends,
Could not help but share this musical version of our reading odyssey hatched in my geographical neck of the woods (Central Texas).
http://www.athensvsparta.com/wordpress/
Cheers,
Valerie
March 30, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)
Dear All,
You may find by now that Book 4 is significantly different from the narratives of the previous three books. Thucydides focuses more closely on three main arenas that were previously introduced in our earlier readings. It is an exciting book which gives us a taste of what Thucydides can do with his writing style which Books 6 & 7 will show in Sicily. Please look over our study guide questions below as you read through Books 4 and the opening chapters of Book 5 (chs. 1-26). I have made use of W. Robert Connor's book Thucydides to help inspire discussion of this turning point in the "Archidamean War". We will discuss the reading and these questions in our next conference call on Monday March 9. As always, let me know if any of these questions grab you enough to lead off a discussion on our next call. Enjoy!
Andre
-"festina lente" (hurry slowly)
Thucydides Book 4.1– 5.26
Three main efforts, a pivotally symbolic triptych
1. Pylos –
Comment: The narration of this event is a marked change of Thucydides’ style compared to previously related campaigns. W. Robert Connor in his assessment Thucydides (Princeton UP, 1985) writes: “Paradox has an important role in the account, and a fully appropriate one. The Pylos operation marks a major turning point in the Histories. It is the first sign of the grand reversal in which the war culminates – the Athenians, at the outset Greece’s major naval power, ultimately lose their fleet; the Spartans, traditionally a land power, acquire an empire and develop the navy to control it. Pylos is our first glimpse of the larger pattern” (Connor, 111).
Questions: What do you think of Connor’s assessment? The description of the Pylos campaign takes up a good portion of the first half of Book 4. Why has Thucydides focused more on the telling of the battle and not as much on the negotiations and politics around the battle? Why do the “rational” Athenians reject an offer of peace from the Spartans? Why do the “belligerent” Spartans offer such rational peace terms?
2. Hermocrates’ speech at Gela – an attempt at unifying ‘Sicilians’ against the influence of the Athenians.
Comment: Hermocrates’ logic is a recognition that aggressive “preventative measures” are the best form of defense in the RealPolitik world of the Greek Mediterranean. W. R. Connor argues that this speech may hearken back to Thucydides’ earlier statement on the cause of the Peloponnesian War in the first place. Thucydides’ original words are: “The truest reason, although the least evident in the discussion, was, in my opinion, that the Athenians by growing great caused fear in the Lacedaemonians and drove them into war” (1.23.6). This may be the repetition of a key theme for Thucydides about the ‘balance of power’ situation in the Mediterranean.
Questions: Once again, as with the Spartan delegation to Athens earlier in Book 4, Hermocrates’ speech is not balanced with an “antilogy” or counterpart speech as we saw Thucydides do earlier in Books 1-3. Why do you suppose Thucydides presents this speech by itself? Is he commenting on the lack of debate among people & governments? Is it a comment on the state of war at this time? Have the ‘courtesies of war’ slowly been dispensed with after so many years of destruction?
3. Brasidas’ operations in Northern Greece –
Comment: Sparta sends out a military commander with some diplomatic skills. The interesting characteristics of Brasidas are not only his ability to combine military effectiveness with politics in the Northern Greek regions, but his ability to promote the mantra of Sparta’s willingness to ‘liberate Greeks from Athenian imperialism.’ In addition, examples of Brasidas’ clemency show a ‘kinder, gentler’ version of one’s typical image of a Spartan, which helps to promote Sparta’s image. Meanwhile, “liberated city-states” continue to install pro-Spartan oligarchies in various cities won over by Brasidas’ charisma. The contrast between Brasidas and Cleon from earlier in Book 4 is inevitable: Cleon the politician-turned-commander meets Brasidas the commander-turned-diplomat at Amphipolis. Both are killed as a result of the battle, but both have made their mark on the war. Neither of them was favorable towards a peace settlement, but with both out of the way, Book 5 opens with a temporary peace that, alas, will not last. The pawns in their game, the city-states of the North, find themselves desperate to ally with a winner who can end this war. Unfortunately, the war’s changing fortunes only lead to reprisals from Athens and more bloodshed.
Questions: What about the ideal of Greek city-state independence? Can it ever exist again? Did it really ever exist prior to this? Which side, Sparta or Athens, are the real “liberators” (if any)? What part did Thucydides himself play in the battle of Amphipolis? Why did he suffer banishment as a result? Could these personal reversals affect his telling of the History? Why does Thucydides focus so much on the personalities of Cleon and Brasidas? Does this method adequately signify larger political and social trends for each of the superpowers? Does this method forecast events for the rest of the war and the post-bellum period for Greece?
March 04, 2009 in 4. Thucydides | Permalink | Comments (0)