A Reading Odyssey

Xenophon's Hellenika July 2010 Book 7- Audio Recording

Here's the audio recording for the Xenophon's Hellenika Book 7 discussion.  Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.

Download Xenophon July 2010 book 7

Xenophon's Hellenika Book 7 Study Guide Questions

Hi all,

I hope your reading of Xenophon's Hellenika is fruitful. Here are some questions to guide you through the last book of Hellenika. We've spent almost half a year journeying through this important document together. Now, it is time for us to come to some conclusions about Xenophon's aims and the lessons that can help us understand his time period as well as our own much better. Keep your questions coming via e-mail, and I look forward to our last group discussion on Monday, July 12.

Andre

1.  Athens & Sparta vs. Thebes

Book VII opens in the year 369 B.C. with Athens and Sparta negotiating an alliance against Thebes, now the preeminent power in Greece.  In sections 7.1-7.14, speeches are given by two men on this topic.  What does Prokles of Phleious advocate vis-à-vis Athens and Sparta?  Why would an alliance between Athens and Sparta be so advantageous to the city-state of Phleious?  Looking back at Prokles’ speech in Book VI.5.38-48 just a year before, what, if anything, is different in what he had proposed to the Athenians at that time?  What does Kephisodotos propose to his fellow Athenians concerning this alliance with Sparta?  What is he most concerned about?  Why does Xenophon begin Book VII with these particular speeches coming from these two delegates?  How do these issues have any bearing on how Book VII ends?

2.  Theban invasion of Peloponnese ‘redux’

As a new campaign season gets underway in 369, Theban fortunes seem to fluctuate (VII.1.15-24).  What is the reason for Thebes’ renewed intervention in the Peloponnese?  How do events unfold regarding the allies for each side (i.e. Thebes and Sparta)?  What is the main reason for Thebes stopping only as far as Corinth in this campaign season?  How well are Athens and Sparta working together at this point to check Theban hegemony?

3.  Allies, allies, allies

The year 368 begins with tensions between Sparta and Thebes still high (VII.1.25-32).  As Arcadia begins military operations independent of its ally Thebes, Sparta moves to block Arcadia’s threat in the northern Peloponnese.  At the same time, Philiskos, a Persian representative, arrives at Delphi to help make some peace between the rival Greek city-states.  While Greek armies maneuver and engage with each other, what is happening within the Theban alliance?  What is Arcadia’s overall strategy vis-à-vis Sparta?  How do Arcadia’s military operations against Sparta have an impact on the ‘peace talks’ at Delphi?  How does Messenia’s (see pictures on p. 277) independence figure in the balance of power?  How decisive was the “tearless battle” for either Sparta or the Theban alliance?  How is change measured in political terms after this battle?  What is Xenophon trying to emphasize in this section concerning Greek allies in general on either side?

4.  Theban-Persian treaty?

In the years 367-366 B.C., Theban strategy leads them to actively seek support from the Persian king.  In VII.1.33-VII.1.46, we see Thebes try to gain an advantage over its Greek neighbors by soliciting Persian backing.  What elements does Thebes have on its side in gaining preferential treatment over other Greek city-states from Persia?  What are the most important proposals made by the Theban envoy Pelopidas in negotiating a treaty with Persia?  Which Greek city-state or federation is the first to refuse the terms of this Theban-Persian treaty?  Why?  Why does this treaty fail with respect even to Thebes’ own allies?  What kind of tension is replacing Greek national interests?  How is this illustrated by the story of Euphron of Sicyon?

 5.  Heroic deeds of Phleious

As VII.2 digresses from the wider events unfolding in Greece, Xenophon describes the deeds of the city-state of Phleious in glowing terms.  What is his reasoning for noting the accomplishments of a “small city” rather than larger Greek city-states?  What characteristics of Phleious are noted and why?  How do these characteristics relate to the overall subject matter in Book VII?

6.  Euphron the tyrant

In VII.3, Xenophon slowly brings us back from the microcosmic example of Phleious to events in Sicyon and how they relate to Thebes in 366 B.C.  How does Euphron’s tyranny over Sicyon compare with the previous story of Phleiasian loyalty to Sparta?  Why would Xenophon juxtapose these two anecdotes here in Book VII?  What point is he trying to make?  Why is Euphron’s death so significant that it be mentioned here?  What does it have to do with Thebes?  Is Thebes shown as being weakened by these disturbances?

7.  Peace for Corinth and a truly ‘Olympian’ battle?

During the years 366-363 B.C., the interests of Athens and Thebes begin to clash more and more.  Caught in between (VII.4.1-10), Corinth negotiates for peace, neutrality, and independence.  Given Corinth’s geographical location and its neighbors, which city-state (i.e. Thebes, Athens, or Sparta) is most threatening to it and why?  What does this say about the state of political affairs across Greece?  Further on in VII.4, more conflict erupts between Arcadia and Elis over the seizure of Lasion (VII.4.12), which initiates further intra-city strife between democratic and oligarchic factions within Elis (VII.4.13-27).  How does Sparta attempt to re-impose its authority on this situation involving northern Peloponnesian city-states?  Who or what is Sparta’s main concern?  Events come to a head and armies converge at the sanctuary of Olympia (VII.4.28-32) of all places.  Who participates in this battle?  What is the result of this conflict for the Greek balance of power?

 

8.  Greeks battle near Sparta and at Mantineia

During 364-363 B.C., Arcadia and its hitherto ally Thebes find themselves needing to settle their differences.  As 362 B.C. opens (VII.5), the absence of Spartan influence seems to be the most noteworthy element as events around Mantineia draw forces from all over Greece:  “the Mantineians and all the rest of the Arcadians who cared for the Peloponnese, and likewise the Eleians and the Achaeans, concluded that the Thebans clearly wanted the Peloponnese be in the very weakest state, so that its enslavement would be as easy as possible” (VII.5.1).  The intervention of both Thebes and Athens at Mantineia forces a potential showdown between many Greek city-states.  How does Xenophon describe Epaminondas’ initial moves into the Peloponnese against the Spartans?  What role does Agesilaos play in these maneuvers?   How does Archidamos lead the Spartans against Epaminondas?  Why does Xenophon praise the Athenians as troops gather around Mantineia.  Why does he not mention his son Gryllos?  How does Xenophon characterize Epaminondas at this point?  How does this compare with his previous description of Epaminondas?  What is Xenophon’s final point about Hellenika (i.e. “Greek affairs”) at the end of this Book?  What are we to understand about affairs between Greek city-states over the course of this whole book, Hellenika?  How does the balance of power in Greece stand at this point?  How does this last chapter address what the first chapter in Book VII began?

Xenophon's Hellenika June 2010 Book 6 - audio recording

Here's the audio recording for the Xenophon Book 6 call.  Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.

Download Xenophon June 2010 book 6

Xenophon's Hellenika Book VI Study Guide Questions

Dear fellow Xenophon readers,

As you finish reading through Book VI, here are some questions for us to think about and discuss on Monday.  I hope your reading has been stimulating.  It has been for me.  I have found that Xenophon has had to figure out a way to relate the battle of Leuctra and the invasion of Laconia to a Spartan audience stung by the shame of these defeats.  We're in for an interesting discussion.  Enjoy the questions for now.

Andre

1.  Spartan hegemony challenged

In chapter 1 (375 B.C.) Polydamas of Pharsalus brings news of how Jason of Pherai intends to challenge rule in Thessaly.  According to Polydamas’ speech, how is Spartan hegemony perceived by Jason of Pherai?  by the people of Pharsalus?  What do Thebes’ actions indicate about hegemony by either Athens or Sparta?  What does Xenophon indicate about Sparta’s military commitments?

 

2.    Corcyra and Greek allies

In chapter 2 (375-372 B.C.), Athens and Sparta spar in the Western coastal islands of Greece.  What do the actions and description of Iphikrates, the Athenian admiral, show concerning Athenian control of the sea-lanes?  What do the actions and description of Mnassipos, the Spartan admiral, show concerning Spartan influence in this area of the Mediterranean?  How significant is the outcome of this particular engagement with respect to both Athens and Sparta?  How does it relate to the allies of each Greek superpower?

 

3.  Saber rattling

In chapter 3, Athenian-Theban relations grow more tense and Sparta is appealed to as a mediator.  Three influential Athenians speak openly about the situation with Thebes in 371 B.C.  What do each of these speeches reveal concerning:

  Athens’ relationship with Sparta? 

  the autonomy of Greek cities under the “King’s peace” (i.e. treaty with king of Persia)?

  Athens’ relationship with Persia?

  Greece’s overall relationship with Persia?

  Thebes’ relationship with the rest of Greece?

 

4.  Thebes ascendant

The year 371 B.C. finds the Spartan king Kleombrotos in chapter 4 stationed in Phocis just north of Boeotia near Thebes.  After consulting with Sparta, what is Kleombrotos’ strategy for dealing with Thebes’ disregard of the recently established treaty?  How is Kleombrotos ultimately compelled to attack Thebes?  What is the point of comparing Kleombrotos to Agesilaos (VI. 4. 5)?  How were the Thebans compelled to fight against the might of Sparta?  What part does religion play in the events leading up to, as well as in the actual battle at Leuctra?  What about the “fortune of war”?

 

5.  Battle of Leuctra

As with other Greek historians, the details of the battle of Leuctra are not always as clear as we modern readers would like since most of it would have been common knowledge to any Greek schoolboy at the time.  However, Xenophon’s emphasis in describing this battle should give hint to how he sees the battle.  Starting at VI. 4. 8, how did the Spartan’s initial victorious skirmish with the Thebans contribute to Theban victory later?  What two other components of Spartan military organization does Xenophon point out that are deficient?  How does Xenophon’s account differ with Diodorus’ (pp. 476-479)?  After a Spartan defeat like this, who grieves more for the Spartans, the families of those Spartan soldiers who died or those who survived to tell about it (VI. 4. 16)?

 

6.  Rise and Fall of Thessaly

After the battle, Thebes requests Athens to ally itself with them (VI. 4. 19), but Athens fails to react.  Thebes then seeks help from Jason of Pherai (VI. 4. 21) who immediately responds.  Looking back at the beginning of Book VI, how does Polydamas portray Jason of Pherai?  How does Jason show himself here?  What do you suppose Jason’s overall strategy is concerning Greece?  What does the rest of Greece think about Jason and his plans?  How does Jason’s death give a clue to what the rest of Greece suspected about Jason?  What does Xenophon think Jason is up to?

 

7.  Invasion of Spartan territory

In chapter 5, Sparta intervenes in affairs between Tegea and Mantineia, and events snowball until the Spartan king Agesilaos invades Mantineia to settle matters in Sparta’s “backyard.”  How does Xenophon describe Agesilaos’ deployment of Spartan force in the Mantineian intervention (VI. 15-21, pp. 254-255)?  Does Agesilaos make any mistakes?  What would have been the best outcome for the Spartans in this intervention?  Why did that not happen?

When Thebes finally arrives to support its allies against Sparta, Xenophon carefully leaves out Agesilaos as leading the Spartan effort.  Who exactly is in charge during this battle between Sparta and Thebes?  What encourages Thebes to actually invade Sparta, something no other Greek city-state had ever done successfully, including Athens?  How does Xenophon characterize the Spartan defense of their own city?

The actual battle between Spartan and Theban forces is represented primarily by an infantry battle at Oion (VI.5.26) and subsequent cavalry skirmishes (VI.5.30-32).  According to Xenophon’s account, what were the primary reasons for Sparta’s defeat and Theban victory?  Is there a decisive moment to this battle or is the decisive moment for Spartan defeat symbolized in some other description by Xenophon?  How is Sparta’s fate in this battle understated and why?

 

8.  Thebes and Athens

As Xenophon concludes Book VI, he reports on deliberations in the city of Athens by Spartan envoys (VI.5.33-48).  We can see Hellenic policy (albeit without much Theban input) being discussed vis-à-vis Athens’ role in the balance of power between Sparta and Thebes.  As Xenophon relates a summary of Spartan arguments for Athens’ help against Thebes (VI.5.33-35), how does Xenophon characterize the logic of these Spartan delegates?  How is the Athenian response in VI.5.36 indicative of a democratic process?

In VI.5.37-48, Xenophon includes two speeches that advocate for closer relations between Sparta and Athens in response to Theban supremacy.  I know that these Greeks can be very persuasive, but how do either Kleiteles or Prokles manage to persuade Athens that it is in their best interest to honor Athens’ treaty with Sparta and confront Thebes with military action?

Xenophon’s concluding remarks center on Athens’ military response to Theban incursion into the Peloponnese.  How does Xenophon characterize this Athenian response?  How does Xenophon describe Iphikrates, the Athenian general, whom Xenophon had shown to be a very able general/admiral both in Books IV and VI?  How is this assessment of Iphikrates also a comment on Athens’ policy toward Sparta?  on Greek politics in general?

Xenophon's Hellenika Books 4 & 5 - May 2010 audio recording

Here's the audio recording for the Xenophon Books 4 & 5 call.  Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.

Download Xenophon May 2010 books 4&5

Xenophon Books IV & V Study Guide Questions

1.  [4.1] Agesilaos the matchmaker

In 395 B.C., Book IV opens with Agesilaos commanding a foreign expeditionary force in Asia Minor against Persian interests and in Persian territory.  Why does Agesilaos feel compelled to arrange a marriage between Otys, king of Paphlagonia, and the daughter of Spithridates?  What are his strategic reasons?  His personal reasons?  How does the Spartan Herippidas both help and hinder Agesilaos’ intentions with this marriage arrangement?

2.  [4.2-4.5] Spartans in battle (394-390 B.C.)

Book 4 concerns itself mostly with the land battles raging in Greece between Sparta and an anti-Sparta coalition of Greek city-states.  What quotes did you notice as you read about other battles, that showed Xenophon’s bias either one way or another?  Does he ever show the Spartans in a less-than-favorable light?  If so, how does Xenophon justify a Spartan defeat or setback?  Who is Xenophons’ favorite person to write about?

3.  [4.6] Agesilaos invades and checks Acarnanian influence? (389 BC)

In order to honor its alliance with Achaea, Sparta sends troops across the Corinthian gulf in order to repel an Acarnanian incursion on Calydos, an Achaean colony.  Although the Spartan general Agesilaos sets up a trophy after a hard-fought land battle, he nevertheless withdraws his troops in autumn with little else to claim against the Acarnanians and their imminent threat on the Achaeans.  Should the Spartans have done more for the Achaeans?  Was Agesilaos as fault in any way?  Does what happens in Acarnania really matter to Spartan interests on the macro level?  How about earlier in this Book with Sparta’s operations around Corinth?  Do you see the Spartans as not strong enough to capture the city of Corinth in Book 4.4-5?  What might Xenophon be saying (albeit subtly or even subconsciously) about Spartan  power?  What could the explanation be for Sparta’s inability to completely subdue Greece?  Is mismanagement the issue?  Bad luck?  Impiety?  Lack of favor from the gods?  Superior strategy from the other side?

4.  [4.7] Piety and Warfare:  the Spartan campaign against Argos (388)

Agesipolis leads an invasion of Argos after carefully consulting Zeus and Apollo whether “it would be considered in accord with piety to reject a proclamation of a holy truce when it had been unjustly declared” (4.7.2).  Having received positive responses, Agesipolis marshals his troops at Phleious (near the isthmus) and marches southward towards Argos.  Xenophon makes an interesting comment on piety and warfare in this section.  What oracles were consulted?  The campaign begins and ends ritually with specific sacrifices.  Why?  What portents or omens are described in 4.7?  To which deities would each portent/omen be ascribed to in Greek culture?  How do we know?  Using Agesipolis as his main example of generalship and ritual piety, Xenophon avoids using Agesilaos, why?  Why haven’t we heard more about sacrifices before battle in other parts of the Hellenika?  [See Appendix J for more information about Ancient Greek Religion.]

5.  [4.8] War at sea: Persia and the Greek city-states (394-389 B.C)

Persian interests are fueled by Sparta’s naval setback at Cnidus.  With a commingling of so many different interests all fueled by Persian money, Xenophon thus shares this political paradox with us:  “…both sides were acting in a way most opposed to their best interests, for the Athenians, who considered the King a friend, were making an alliance with Euagoras, who was fighting against the King, and Teleutias, even though the Spartans were at war with the King, was destroying those who were also sailing the wage war against him” (4.8.24).  How are Persian interests understood in this political context?  How does Xenophon comment on the way that Persia plays one Greek city-state off another?  How effective is Persia’s policy vis-à-vis Greece at this point?  Do you think the Persian King is aware of such undercurrents or cross purposes among his subordinates?  If so, does he or should he care?  What sort of irony is there from the Greek point of view?

6.  [4.8-5.1] Athens, Sparta, and the “King’s Peace” (390-387 B.C.)

Xenophon’s narration of events leading up to the “King’s Peace” are summed up well:  “The Athenians saw that the enemy’s ships were numerous, and they began to fear that they would be conquered as completely as they had been before; they also saw that the King [of Persia] was now an ally of the Spartans, and they were still being harassed by plundering raids from Aegina” (5.1.29) (p. 183).  Looking at these three elements that Xenophon considered so essential in bringing Athens to the bargaining table, were these the result of a deliberate Spartan strategy?  If so, what other aspects of making peace could Sparta have tried if these did not work?  If not, what ways of defeating the rebellious Greek city-states should Sparta have tried?

7.  [5.1-5.4] Spartan Hegemony and the King’s Peace (386-375 B.C.)

What are the effects on Greek city-states after the King’s Peace is ratified?  What does Persia get out of it?  What does Sparta get out of it?  Does any other Greek city-state get anything significant out of this treaty?  How does the King’s Peace limit or expand Spartan hegemony in Greece?

8.  [5.2-5.4] Four Examples of Spartan Policy (385-375 B.C.)

In Book V, Xenophon weaves Spartan intervention in four distinct examples:  Mantineia, Phleious, Chalcidice and Thebes.  Two locations represent more domestic related interventions (Mantineia and Phleious), while the other two might be considered more foreign territory (i.e. outside the Peloponnese).  The events mainly connected to these four areas under Spartan control span the course of about ten years.  How does Spartan policy reflect in each of these locations?  How does Spartan policy in these areas affect neighboring Greek city-states?  Persia?  Spartan allies?  What is the role of oligarchical versus democratic government in Greece during this time?

Xenophon Quotes

Dear fellow Xenophon readers:

           

Nota Bene:

Did you know...

that Spartiates (full Spartan male citizens) served in the army till they reached the age of sixty?  (4.5.14c)

           

            Book 4 concerns itself mostly with the land battles still raging in Greece itself.  Agesilaos is recalled from Asia Minor to help Sparta neutralize various Greek city-states rebelling against Spartan hegemony in Greece (4.1-4.2).  Greek city-states like Athens, Argos, Thebes, and Corinth are all being funded and encouraged by the Persian king to attack Sparta.  Xenophon describes these conflicts at the Nemea River in the Peloponnese (4.2) and in Agesilaos' march from the other direction through Boeotia and Thessaly (4.3).  Much of the fighting between Sparta and the other Greeks in alliance in Book 4.4-5 centers around Corinth, which is tenaciously held under siege by the anti-Spartan alliance and which Sparta is not able to completely subdue.  I always thought that the Spartans were able to conquer what they set their minds to.  Now I am not so sure.  As I have recently read through the Corinthian operations in Book 4, these quotes caught my attention.

           

            "Some Spartans from the camp, holding their spears, were following as guards, and they were being closely watched by those present, for those who are fortunate and victorious always seem for some reason to be worth looking at." (p. 149)(4.5.6)

           

            "Now inasmuch as such a defeat was most unusual for the Spartans, there was much grieving throughout the army - except for those whose sons, fathers, or brothers had died in that battle:  these men went around with beaming faces, delighting in their personal misfortune, as if they had been victors." (p. 151) (4.5.10)

           

            We will talk about these quotes (and other questions I plan to send out) on our next conference call on Monday May 10 @8pm EST. 

           

            *Also, check out one of our reader's, Jim Janicki's, interview on the Reading Odyssey website.  He shares his experience with reading books through Reading Odyssey (he's read quite a few with us so far) and how he applies his readings to his business and his life.*

           

Andre

Xenophon's Hellenika March 22, 2010 Books II.3.11- III audio recording

Here's the audio recording for the Xenophon Books II.3.11 - III call.  Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.

Download Xenophon Mar 22 2010 bks II - III

Xenophon's Hellenika Books II.3.11-III Study Guide Questions

Hi fellow Xenophon readers,

As you read through the next section of Hellenika in anticipation of our next conference call, here are some questions to help guide you and call attention to particular moments in the text.  In the next week, I will be asking some of you to take on a question that will move our discussion along.  You may respond in any way you like:  with some commentary, some questions that still need to be answered by the group, or both.  In the meantime, send our group an email about your reading experience.  It has been quite interesting to read not only about the conclusion of a long drawn-out war between Athens and Sparta, but also revealing about the post-war chaos and power vacuum that ensues in a defeated country (Athens).  I wonder if anyone sees any comparable historical parallels...

happy reading,

Andre

Xenophon Reading Group 2010
Books II.3.11 - III Study Guide Question

1. The Tyranny of the Thirty 

In 404 (Book II.3.11 - 56), the tyranny of the Thirty is called to task by one of their own, Theramenes.  Xenophon presents two points of view from within the ranks of the Thirty:  Kritias’ accusation and Theramenes’ defense.  Athens’ immediate post-war administration is admittedly a scary one.  How practical are Kritias’ arguments?  How defendable are Theramenes’ arguments, considering what he is being accused of?  How is democracy working in Athens at this point?  What does this regime remind us of today?

2. Rebellion at Athens

In 403, pro-Athenian exiles led by Thrasyboulos gather to take back Athens from the Thirty.  At Athens’ main port (the Peiraieus) the pro-Spartan Athenians are defeated.  How do the Spartans react to this threat to Athens?  What does the result say about the Spartan ability to run an empire?  What does the result say about Athenian independence?  (II.4.1 - II.4.43)

3. Sparta vs. Persia 

In 401-400 (III.1.1 - III.1.3) - two very important events introduce Book 3:  a successful invasion and withdrawal of Greek mercenary troops into Persia (i.e. Xenophon’s Anabasis) in 401 which reveals Persia’s vulnerability and Tissaphernes’ attempt to control Ionian (Greek) cities in Asia Minor.  This in turn triggers direct Spartan military intervention on Persian soil in 399-397 (III.1 - III.2.20).  How were the Spartan generals Thibron & Derkylidas able to succeed in Asia Minor against the might of Persia?  What does Xenophon teach us about the effectiveness of Persian satrapies and administration?

4. Sparta vs. Elis 

Sometime around 402-401 (III.2.21 -  III.2.31), the Spartans put political pressure on their Peloponnesian neighbor to the north, Elis.  The Spartan king Agis leads the war against Elis and eventually achieves a victory.  Given the various reasons that Xenophon puts forth for this conflict, what do you suppose was really the root cause?  How does this Sparta - Elis conflict reflect Sparta’s ability to control its Peloponnesian allies in general?  Looking at Diodorus’ account of this same event in Appendix O (14.17.4-12, 14.34.1), how do the two accounts compare?  What does each account emphasize that the other doesn’t?

5. Sparta’s new king?

King Agis’ death around the year 400 brings up the question of Spartan monarchical succession soon after the Spartan-Elis conflict. In Book III.3.1-3, Leotychidas and Agesilaos contend for the kingship.  What does Xenophon reveal to us about Spartan dynastic lineage and the power of Spartan queens through this debate between Leotychidas and Agesilaos?  (Note:  Appendix E, section 22 on pp. 357-358 briefly comments on Xenophon’s exclusion of Spartan women in the Hellenika).   

6. Kinadon’s conspiracy?

The first event associated with Agesilaos’ early rule is Kinadon’s conspiracy (III.3.4-11).  Given the nature and extent of this conspiracy within Sparta, what do you suppose concerns Xenophon so much by including the account of it in this way?  What does this conspiracy say about the state of Sparta’s internal affairs at this time?

7. Agesilaos invades Asia Minor

[recap:  After a flashback and digression into Sparta’s internal affairs (see questions #4-6 above), Xenophon picks up the narrative of Spartan military operations in Asia Minor (399-397) left off at III.2.20, when Derkylidas concluded a truce concerning Ionia and its coastal Greek city-states, with two Persian satraps, Tissaphernes (south) and Pharnabazos (north).  This truce in 397 resulted in Derkylidas withdrawing Spartan land troops from Persian territory in Asia Minor with the agreement that Ionia be regarded as independent by Persia.  It is assumed that Derkylidas was then relieved of his command.]

In the year 396 at the beginning of Book III.4, Agesilaos and Lysander lead an expedition back to Asia Minor and Persian territory in response to Persia’s increase of its naval forces with Phoenician ships.  Outnumbered by both Persian land and naval forces, what is Agesilaos’ strategy in dealing with the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos?  How does Agesilaos make the best use of his own troops on the tactical level in individual battles?  What is the significance of religion, piety, and sacrifices on Agesilaos’ decisions?

With such detail being given by Xenophon in these chapters, do you suspect that this information is from Xenophon’s own first-hand experience campaigning with Agesilaos?  If so, are there any examples of historical detail that stand out more prominently for you in these chapters than in any others before this?

What is the ultimate goal for this Spartan military intervention on Persian soil?  How do we know, if at all, that the Spartan mission has been fulfilled?  What, if anything, do the Spartans get out of this campaign in the years 396-395 (III.4.1 - III.4.29)?

8.  Greece rebels against Sparta

As Xenophon opens III.5 on p. 110, he digresses from Agesilaos’ campaign in Asia (see question #7 above) back to events in Greece in 395.  On orders from the Persian king, Tithraustes had just previously eliminated Tissaphernes, a Persian satrap, and directly intervened in negotiations with Agesilaus.  With these events going on in Asia, Tithraustes attempts to bribe other Greek city-states to turn against Sparta.  To some extent, Persian bribery succeeds in stirring up some unrest among the Greeks against Sparta.  Which city-state leads the revolt against Spartan hegemony in Greece?  Why do certain Greek city-states decide to actively resist against Sparta?  With troops already fighting in Asia Minor and with king Agesilaos far off, why would the Spartans think it prudent to respond to Greek baiting and initiate a second military campaign?

Xenophon includes some stirring rhetoric in III.5.8-15.  Given the relations between Athens and Thebes in the Peloponnesian war, how convincing is this speech?  How ironic is it from Xenophon’s point of view?

Greek armies clash at Haliartos (III.5.17-24).  What is the outcome? What does this battle say about Spartan hegemony over other Greek city-states in 395?  What happens to the Spartan king Pausanias in 394 (III.5.25)?  What does king Pausanias’ banishment say about Sparta’s leadership at this time?

Xenophon's Hellenika February 2010 Bks I - II.3 Audio Recording

Here is the audio recording for Xenophon's Hellenika Books I - II.3.10.  Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.

Download Xenophon Feb 2010 bks I - II